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If a seller delivers a good non-conforming to the contract, Article 2 of the UCC
as well as European warranty law allows consumers to choose between some money
transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly
for fear that the buyer resorts to "opportunistic termination", i.e. takes non-
conformity as a pretext to get rid of a contract he no longer wants. We show
that the possibility of opportunistic termination might actually have positive ef-
fects. Under some circumstances, it will lead to redistribution in favour of the
buyer without any loss of eﬃciency. Moreover, by curbing the monopoly power
of the seller, a regime involving termination increases welfare by enabling a more
eﬃcient output level in a setting with multiple buyers.
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It is quite common that a buyer does not get what he has contracted for: The seam of a
dress may become unstitched shortly after purchase, the new DVD player may start to
stagger after one year, the construction ﬁrm may not build according to the architect’s
plan or the travel agency informs you that you will be accommodated in a hotel diﬀerent
from the one you booked.
The remedies available to the buyer in such situations are governed by warranty
law as laid down in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Priest (1978)) and
Directive 1999/44 of the European Community on the sale of consumer goods (Parisi
(2004)). It basically gives the victim of non-conforming delivery the right to choose
between expectation damages and termination (hereafter EDT regime).1 If the buyer
chooses expectation damages he receives a monetary compensation so that in terms of
utility he is in the same position as if the contract had been duly performed.2 If the
buyer chooses termination this will lead to restitution, i.e. he will return the good to the
seller and recover the price.3
It is quite common that contract law provides the non-breaching party with the option
to choose between two or more remedies. Yet, the existing economic literature, with the
noteworthy exception of Ayres and Madison (2000) and Avraham(2006), has so far largely
focused on exclusive regimes, i.e. regimes where only one legal remedy is available to
the victim of breach.4 As warranty law is of huge practical relevance and happens to be
governed by largely the same optional legal regime in both the United States and the
European Community, there is a gap to ﬁll. We therefore analyze the properties of the
EDT regime by comparing it to a prominent exclusive regime, namely pure expectation
damages (hereafter ED-regime).5 ED is the default remedy in common law and was
shown to perform reasonably well under many diﬀerent circumstances.6
Our analysis allows us to expose a function of warranty law that has so far gone
unnoticed. It is commonly held (e.g. Parisi (2004)) that there are three main functions
1The regime applies if the delivered goods are non-conforming to the contract and cannot be restored
to conformity by either repair or replacement.
2Note that Article 3 (5) of EC Directive 1999/44 does not speak of "expectation damages" but of
"appropriate reduction of the price". In our paper we will use "expectation damages" as a benchmark
largely in order to make the paper comparable to the existing literature. Moreover, using "price reduc-
tion" will not qualitatively alter the insights of this paper. A discussion of this claim is available from
the author upon request.
3EC Directive 1999/44 uses the term "rescission" instead of "termination". We do not want to
enter into the niceties of legal terminology (Farnsworth (2004) §8.15 n. 2) and will use "termination"
synonymous with "cancellation" and "rescission".
4See e.g. Shavell (1980), Shavell (1984), Rogerson (1984), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Che and
Chung (1999) who explore the relative performance of diﬀerent exclusive remedy regimes under various
assumptions about the nature of investment, the nature of the breach decision and the possibility of
renegotiaion.
5We are only aware of one other model (Avraham (2006)) which - like ours - compares a regime of
optional remedies with an exclusive remedy.
6See Schweizer (2006) and the literature cited there.
1of legal warranties: Brown (1974) has shown that warranties can be used to eﬃciently
allocate the risk of product defect, given the parties’ risk attitudes (insurance function),
Spence (1974) and Grossman (1981) pointed to the revelation of private information about
product quality (signalling function) and Priest (1981) argued that warranties provide
incentives for the production and preservation of quality (incentive function). In our
paper we want to argue that warranties also serve an antitrust function.
We consider a setting where, at the outset, both the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s
ability to deliver the good in conforming quality are uncertain. While the buyer’s valua-
tion is modelled as an exogenous random variable the probability of conforming delivery
is determined by an investment decision of the seller. Both buyer and seller are risk
neutral and symmetrically informed. Even if the buyer’s valuation is low and quality is
non-conforming, the buyer values the good more than the seller, so that trade is always
eﬃcient ex post. The contracting problem, therefore, is to induce eﬃcient investment
incentives and to make sure that parties trade ex post.
It is well known that a contract stipulating price and quality [P,q] and a legal regime
which requires the breaching party to pay expectation damages will achieve ﬁrst best if -
as in our case - it is the investing party who breaches (Shavell (1980)). This is so because
ED makes the investing seller a residual claimant of the trade surplus and induces the
eﬃcient ex-post trade decision. 7
It is, however, far from obvious that we should be able to achieve ﬁrst best with the
EDT regime. If, for some reason, the buyer’s valuation for the good decreases below the
contracted price the buyer will have the incentive to terminate the contract if he is given
the right to do so (e.g. Priest (1978), Parisi (2004), Wehrt (1995), Schlechtriem and
Schmidt-Kessel (2005), Para 534). This phenomenon of opportunistic termination may
give rise to ex post ineﬃciency if renegotiation is (prohibitively) costly.8 Moreover, we
will see that the seller is strictly worse oﬀ if the buyer chooses termination rather than
expectation damages. He may therefore overinvest into quality in order to reduce the
probability of the buyer choosing termination. Yet, a trivial ﬁrst best solution can indeed
be achieved under the EDT regime, with a contract [P,q,T] where T is an lump sum
side payment from the buyer to the seller. Parties could simply set a price low enough
to prevent the buyer from choosing termination and compensate the seller by raising the
lump sum payment.9
In a way, however, this result makes our attempt to expose the virtues of the EDT
regime an uphill battle: Why should we be interested in a regime if the best we can achieve
can be had much easier with a pure ED regime? Indeed, we can ﬁnd two arguments
why EDT diﬀers from ED in an interesting way: First, the possibility of opportunistic
7The result can also be interpreted as a polar case of Priest’s "investment theory" (Priest (1981)).
8We consider the renegotiation case in another paper.
9See Edlin (1996) for the general idea of using lump sum side payments in order to achieve ﬁrst best
solutions in the context of contract remedies.
2termination under the EDT regime can lead to a redistribution of welfare in favour of
the buyer without sacriﬁcing ﬁrst best. This redistribution eﬀect has the special property
that it leaves the payoﬀ of sellers in fairly competitive markets unaﬀected while putting
a ceiling on the extent that a monopolistic seller can take advantage of his monopoly
power.10 Second, by extending our model to a setting with multiple buyers, it can be
shown that the EDT regime can improve on the ED regime in eﬃciency terms. It turns
out, that EDT acts as a substitute to price regulation in cases which are below the radar
screen of antitrust authorities.
An important feature of our model is that we do not allow for lump sum payments.
This assumption is usually motivated by citing wealth constraints (e.g. Aghion and
Bolton (1992) and Aghion and Tirole (1994)). In our case, it captures a crucial legal
property of the EDT regime: If a party terminates the contract all payments made under
the contract - including any lump sum payment - are reversed as a matter of law.11 This
eliminates an often used instrument to split the ex ante gains of trade without aﬀecting
incentives. Parties might therefore be forced to simultaneously determine incentives and
distribution such that "ex ante bargaining power inﬂuences not only the distribution of
the pie, but also its size"(Aghion and Tirole (1994)).
Under ED it makes no diﬀerence whether side payments are possible or not as the
damage measure sets the right incentives independent of the price. So price can be
used as an instrument to distribute the ex ante expected surplus according to the parties’
bargaining power. Yet, a problem potentially arises under the EDT regime: For ﬁrst best,
price has to be set low enough in order to prevent the buyer from choosing termination.
Absent lump sum payments, we would expect the seller not to be willing to set such a low
price, especially if his bargaining power is high. Yet, we will see that he will frequently go
along with the low price nevertheless. This result is driven by a discontinuity in the seller’s
payoﬀ function. As he sets the price higher than a certain threshold, termination will
be part of the buyer’s equilibrium strategy. If, as assumed, renegotiation is prohibitively
costly, this will make his expected payoﬀ jump down. The seller will therefore often
refrain from pushing the price beyond that threshold. He prefers a smaller share of a
larger pie to a bigger share of a smaller pie. This vindicates our ﬁrst claim that EDT
can lead to a redistribution in favour of the buyer without sacriﬁcing ﬁrst best.
Given this result, our second claim, that switching from the ED to the EDT regime
10We therefore present an exception to the general rule that it is not possible to redistribute income
with contractual remedies as parties will always adjust the contract price such that payoﬀs reﬂect their
respective bargaining power (e.g. Craswell (1991) or Polinsky (1983), p. 108).
11See e.g. Schlechtriem and Schmidt-Kessel (2005), AT Para. 525. As it is often legally impossible to
promise the exchange of payments in a separate agreement which is shielded from the main contract there
is no easy legal way to circumvent this. Yet, Edlin (1996) suggests, that under the consideration doctrine
of common law this would be possible by setting up a separate contract with a separate consideration.
Still, for our purposes, it is hard to imagine that consumers will resort to this technique in their everyday
shopping activity. Note that an example of a lump sum side payment that could not be reversed is
advisory service prior to the sale. Yet, for our purposes, this transfer would go into the wrong direction.
3can increase welfare in a setting with multiple buyers by breaking the monopoly power of
the seller is not particularly surprising. In order to illustrate this fact, we will construct a
simple example where this is the case. We consider two customers with identical valuation
but diﬀerent wealth constraints which are potential consumers of a single unit of the good.
It is assumed that the seller cannot distinguish between the two types so that he cannot
engage in discriminatory pricing. From a welfare perspective it is always desirable to trade
with both customers if the expected valuation of the consumers exceeds the producer’s
cost. Yet, for the seller it will only be attractive to set the price low enough for the low
wealth customer if the extra proﬁt he makes by gaining the additional customer outweighs
the loss of proﬁt he incurs by also reducing the price for the customer who is willing and
able to pay the high price. As switching from the ED to the EDT regime lowers the
seller’s margin, the proﬁt on the high wealth customer that the seller has to sacriﬁce
in order to accommodate the low wealth customer is lower under EDT than under ED.
Therefore he is more likely to lower the price under EDT, enabling a more eﬃcient volume
of trade.
Our analysis sheds light on some issues of practical importance: We will argue that the
scepticism of many legal scholars towards generous termination rights might be overblown.
Our model oﬀers no justiﬁcation for the fact that the law tends to disallow termination
unless non-conformity passes a certain threshold level. We also ﬁnd an argument in favor
of mandatory termination rights for consumer buyers as stipulated in Directive 1999/44
of the European Community. Such a mandatory regime can have an antitrust eﬀect by
acting as a substitute to price regulation. For the United States the policy implication
would be to consider making Article 2 of the UCC mandatory for consumer buyers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our model. After working
out the benchmark case in section 3 we compare the ED and EDT regime in section
4. Section 5 states our main results. An extension in section 6 shows that EDT might
increase welfare in a setting with multiple buyers. In section 7, we conduct comparative
statics exercises and further discuss our ﬁndings. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a seller and a buyer who can trade one unit of a good of a certain quality.12
Both the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s ability to deliver the good in conforming
quality are uncertain. The buyer’s valuation   V is exogenous. It will be either high (V )
with probability λ or low (V ) with probability 1 − λ.13 While the buyer’s valuation
12Quality is either standard quality which courts would assume by default or speciﬁed in the contract.
13Note that   V does not depend on whether delivery will be conforming or not. Rather it captures the
possibility that circumstances relevant for the buyer’s valuation change between the conclusion of the
contract and the time when the he can invoke non-conformity. If, for example, somebody buys furniture
which is tailored to his house the value of these goods to him will be much lower if he has to move
somewhere else.
4is strictly positive (V > 0), we assume that the good has zero value to the seller.14
Probability γ that the seller is able to deliver in conforming quality is endogenously
determined by the seller’s investment c: It will be γ ∈ (0,1) if the seller invests   c and 0
otherwise.15 We further assume that, if the delivered good is non-conforming, the buyer’s
valuation, whether low or high, is reduced by a factor δ ∈ (0, 1].16 All parameters are
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Figure 1: Timeline.
In the ﬁrst period (see Figure 1), the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer P.17
If the buyer rejects (a=0) he will earn his reservation utility u and the seller will get 0.
If the buyer accepts (a=1), the seller chooses c and delivers the good. Subsequently, the
buyer’s valuation and the quality of the good are realized.18 If the good is conforming
to the quality speciﬁed in the contract (Γ = 1) the buyer receives the good and pays the
contracted price. If the good is non-conforming (Γ = 0) the buyer can choose the legal
remedies available under either the ED or the EDT regime. In Section 4 we will explain
in detail how these remedies aﬀect payoﬀs.
The negotiation set-up in stage 1 and 2 can be motivated by assuming that each seller
has monopoly power over his speciﬁc good but an imperfect substitute is available to the
consumer from which he can derive expected utility u. Note, that u can be interpreted
as a parameter for market structure. High u can be associated with highly competitive
markets where the consumer always has a close substitute at hand. Low u capture the
case of uncompetitive markets where no or only very imperfect substitutes for the seller’s
product are available.19
14Very often, it will be diﬃcult for the seller to resell defective goods which have already been used
e.g. because it is too expensive to repackage them.
15Modelling γ ( ) is an increasing and convex twice diﬀerentiable function would not change results
qualitatively but unnecessarily complicates comparative statics.
16This implies that the value of the non-conforming good is strictly positive, i.e. we exclude the
possibility that the loss due to non-conforming delivery exceeds the value of the conforming good.
17We assume that it is not possible to write a contingent contract P(˜ V ). Indeed, such a contract might
not hold before the court, because it would circumvent mandatory termination rights of consumer law.
18We assume that a possible defect is hidden to both the buyer and the seller and only surfaces after
delivery. Therefore the seller cannot wait until quality is realized and then set the price.
19The necessity to explicitly model the negotiation stage follows directly from ruling out lump sum
side payments. If the buyer chooses termination, the law requires that all payments made under the
contract be reversed. Of course, lump sum side payments would still be eﬀective if the buyer chooses
ED. Yet, as can be seen in Figure 2, this is already captured in our model as we can reinterpret P as a
net price which equals P∗ + T where P∗ would be the contract price and T the up-front payment.
5The timing of our model assumes that the contract is made before the seller makes his
investment. This will e.g. be the case if the consumer orders a tailor made suit. Often,
however, the seller will ﬁrst produce the good and then conclude the contract. If we
assume that investments become relationship speciﬁc only after the investment decision
- say at the time of delivery - we can show that the results of our model will still hold.
This assumption is rather plausible as the resale value will often decrease as the good is
unpacked and starts to be used.
3 Benchmark
First, as a benchmark, we work out the decisions that maximize social welfare. As, by
assumption, the buyer’s valuation of the good will always be higher than the valuation
of the seller, it is socially optimal that parties always trade ex post. The socially optimal





Total (c) = argmax
c
E  V − c − (1 − γ)δE  V . (1)
Note that, expected social payoﬀ equals the buyer’s expected valuation minus invest-
ment cost and expected devaluation due to non-conforming delivery. As the probability
of conforming delivery is   γ if the seller invests   c and 0 otherwise it follows that it is
socially optimal for the seller to invest if and only if:
E  V − δE  V < E  V − c − (1 − γ)δE  V . (2)
Therefore, the socially optimal investment level is:
c0 =
 
  c if c < γδE  V
0 otherwise
. (3)
In the following we will consider the eﬀect of introducing legal regimes. In particular,
we will compare the ED and the EDT regime.
4 Legal Regimes
4.1 Payoﬀs
If the buyer rejects the seller’s oﬀer (a=0) he will earn his reservation utility u and the
seller’s payoﬀ will be zero. If the buyer accepts the oﬀer (a=1) and chooses ED in the case
of non-conformity his utility will be the value of the conforming good minus price,   V −P
(see Figure 2). This is so because he will receive damages from the seller that will fully
compensate him in terms of utility if delivery is non-conforming. The seller’s payoﬀ will
be price minus investment cost and the damage payment in the event of non-conforming
delivery, P − c − (1 − Γ)δ  V .
6If the buyeraccepts the oﬀer and chooses termination (T) in the case of non—conformity
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Figure 2: Subgame starting from the seller’s investment decision.
4.2 ED regime




S (c) = P − c − (1 − γ)δE  V . (4)
Comparing (4) with (1) we see that it diﬀers from expected social payoﬀ by E  V − P










Total (c) = c0. (5)
The buyer accepts the oﬀer whenever his expected payoﬀ exceeds reservation utility:
Π
ED
B = E  V − P ≥ u. (6)
As the seller’s payoﬀ increases in P it is optimal for him to oﬀer a price for which the
buyer’s PC is binding:
PED (u) = E  V − u (7)
20Remember that we assumed that the good has no resale or scrap value.
7provided that his own participation constraint is satisﬁed. Inserting (7) into (4) it
can be seen that:
Π
ED
S (PED) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Π
0
Total ≥ u (8)
which means that the seller’s participation constraint is satisﬁed whenever there are
potential gains of trade. The subgame perfect equilibrium under ED can therefore be
characterized by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The ED regime achieves ﬁrst-best allocation, price will be set at E  V − u and
the buyer earns his reservation utility.
4.3 EDT regime
Suppose that the good is delivered in non-conforming quality. Then, under EDT, the
buyer chooses between expectation damages and termination at stage 5. Termination
will only be optimal for him if his valuation turns out to be lower than the price:
  V − P < 0 ⇐⇒   V < P. (9)
Yet, in order for termination to occur in equilibrium it is not suﬃcient that the buyer
wants to terminate. He must also have the legal opportunity to do so, i.e. performance
has to be non-conforming (Γ = 0). The probability of termination thus increases in the
seller’s price oﬀer and decreases in his investment into quality:
πT = prob
 
  V < P
 
(1 − γ(c)). (10)
The seller’s expected payoﬀ under EDT can then be written as:
Π
EDT





       V < P
  
. (11)
It equals the seller’s payoﬀ under ED (4) minus the expected eﬀect of termination: If
the buyer chooses termination the seller will not get the price but neither will he have to




Total = E  V − c − (1 − γ)δE  V − πT (1 − δ)E
 
  V
       V < P
 
(12)
where (1 − δ)E
 
  V
       V < P
 
is the expected loss whenever the buyer terminates. As
we assume that valuation can either be V or V with V > V > 0, three cases can be
distinguished depending on the contract price. It is obvious that the buyer would never
accept a price P > V in equilibrium. We will therefore consider the two remaining cases
P ≤ V and V < P ≤ V :
8a) Case P ≤V : If P is smaller than V , which is the lowest possible realization of   V ,
the buyer’s valuation always exceeds the price. Probability of termination will therefore
be zero (10). Inserting πT = 0 into equation (11) gives us:
Π
a
S (P,c) = P − c − (1 − γ)δE  V = Π
ED
S (c).21 (13)
Thus, conditional on P < V , payoﬀs under EDT are just the same as under ED (see
4). It immediately follows that ca = c0 i.e. it is optimal for the seller to choose ﬁrst best
investment levels at stage 3. Finally, total expected payoﬀ is:
Π
a
Total (c) = E  V − c − (1 − γ)δE  V = Π
0
Total (c). (14)
b) Case V < P ≤V : In this case, P will be higher than   V if the low state V is realized.
The probability of termination will therefore be:
πT = (1 − λ)(1 − γ), (15)
the expression for the seller’s expected payoﬀ simpliﬁes to:
Π
b
S (c) = P − c − (1 − γ)δE  V − πT (P − δV ) (16)
and total expected payoﬀ is given by:
Π
b
Total (c) = E  V − c − (1 − γ)δE  V − πT (1 − δ)V . (17)
Note that
φP ≡ πT (1 − δ)V (18)
measures expected ex post ineﬃciency due to termination. The seller will choose







If cb  = c0 this gives rise to ex-ante ineﬃciency due to distortion of investment incen-
tives:
φA ≡ (cb − c0) + [γ0 − γb]δE  V . (20)
where γ0 ≡ γ (c0) and γb ≡ γ (cb). Summarizing cases a) and b) the seller’s payoﬀ







S (c0) = P − c0 − (1 − γ0)δE  V if P ≤ V
Πb
S = ΠED
S (c0) − φA − πT (P − δV ) if P > V
. (21)
This payoﬀ function exposes an interesting feature of the EDT regime. For P ≤ V
the seller’s payoﬀs under ED and EDT are identical and increasing in price. However,














Figure 3: Seller’s payoﬀ under ED and EDT depending on price.
seller’s payoﬀ jumps down. Payoﬀ under ED, however, continues to rise smoothly in P
(see Figure 3).
Therefore, whereas under ED the seller always chooses the highest price that satisﬁes
the buyer’s PC (see Lemma 1) this can be diﬀerent under EDT. Indeed, it might be in
the seller’s interest to set the price at V , which is the highest price for which he can avoid
termination, rather than at PEDT (u), which sets the buyer’s utility to his reservation
level.23 In Figure 3 this happens for PEDT (u) ∈ (V ,P ′].
5 Main Result
In the previous section we solved the subgames induced by ED and EDT starting from
the seller’s investment decision. We showed that EDT leads to a discontinuity in the
seller’s payoﬀ function which might have a moderating eﬀect on the seller’s price oﬀer.
This provides the intuition for our main result which we will derive in the remainder
of this section by solving the game through stages 2 and 1. In essence, we will show
that switching from ED to EDT may lead to redistribution from the seller to the buyer
without sacriﬁcing ﬁrst best. Although increasing the consumer’s welfare is often seen as
desirable in its own right24 we will also be concerned with overall welfare improvement.
21The superscript in Πa
S reminds us that this is conditional on case a).
22We will later prove that the seller has the incentive to overinvest into quality.
23Price may not exceed valuation in the low case in order to always induce ex post trade. In the model
the seller can inﬂuence the ex post trade decision by lowering the price. However, if the seller is able
to directly inﬂuence the valuation of the seller through cooperative investments (which he cannot in our
model) EDT would provide incentives for cooperative investments (see Che and Hausch (1999) and Che
and Chung (1999)).
24See e.g. Recital 29 of the EC Merger Regulation 139/2004.
10By a simple extension in section 6 we show that it is also possible to raise social welfare
in a setting with multiple buyers.
Proposition 1 If the devaluation due to non-conforming delivery is small, switching
from ED to EDT has the following eﬀect: For an intermediate range of market struc-
tures prices decrease and distribution of surplus changes in favour of the buyer, while
preserving ﬁrst best investment incentives. For highly competitive markets changing the
regime has strictly no eﬀect. For very uncompetitive markets, it may lead to higher prices
and ineﬃcient investment while putting the onus of the eﬃciency loss exclusively on the
seller. Trade level remains unchanged. If the devaluation due to non-conforming delivery
is high, ineﬃciency occurs in uncompetitive markets. In competitive markets there will

































Figure 4: Payoﬀ under ED and EDT depending on buyer’s reservation utility u.
Figure 4 presents a leading case that illustrates the proposition. Note, that for very
low devaluation due to non-conformity (very low δ) it may be the case that ineﬃciency
disappears and redistribution even occurs for small u. For high devaluation due to non-
conformity (high δ), switching from EDT to ED leads to ineﬃcient investment, ineﬃcient
ex post trade decisions and loss of ex ante trade volume. For an illustration of all possible
cases see Figure 9 in Appendix A.
5.1 Discussion
For low devaluation due to non-conforming delivery, switching from ED to EDT has an
attractive feature: It curbs the monopoly power of the seller for an intermediate range
11of market structures without sacriﬁcing any welfare. If, however, markets are highly
competitive, neither eﬃciency nor distribution will be aﬀected. Yet, failure to limit the
seller’s share in the gains of trade will be largely irrelevant under such circumstances. For
markets which are close to outright monopoly, changing from ED to EDT will decrease
welfare. This, however, should not be of too much concern as these markets are likely to
be under the scrutiny of antitrust authorities. Prices will therefore often be regulated or
set under the threat of regulation. Moreover, consistent with our ﬁndings, Article 1 (2b) of
the EC Directive 1999/44 exempts from its scope classical monopolies like water, gas and
electricity. Similar provisions existed for public transport. Therefore, the attractiveness
of the EDT regime lies in its capability to limit the monopoly power of sellers in markets
which traditionally are below the radar screen of antitrust authorities. Moreover, this is
achieved without creating distortive eﬀects on competitive markets.
For high levels of δ, switching from ED to EDT is much less attractive. It may lead
to major distortions and even loss of trade volume. This ineﬃciency, however, may be
empirically negligible as we will argue on the basis of the comparative statics exercises in
section 7. In the remainder of this section we will continue to solve the game induced by
EDT through the negotiation stages 2 and 1.
5.2 Negotiation Stage
a) Case P ≤V: The buyer accepts the seller’s oﬀer in stage 2 if he earns at least his
reservation utility u. We can write this condition using equations (13) and (14):
Π
a
B (c0) ≥ u ⇐⇒ Π
a
Total (c0) − Π
a
S (c0) = E  V − Pa ≥ u. (22)
The seller’s payoﬀ increases in price. Provided that his PC is satisﬁed, he therefore
sets equilibrium price Pa such that the buyer’s PC is binding unless this price would
exceed V (which is the highest price for which case a) applies):
Pa = min
 




E  V − u for u >   u ≡ E  V − V
V for u ≤   u
. (23)
i) u > ¯ u. Inserting Pa = E  V − u into (22) we get:
Π
a
S (c0) = Π
0
Total (c0) − u ≥ 0. (24)
for the seller’s PC which is satisﬁed whenever there are potential gains of trade. This
gives us the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If total payoﬀ exceeds cut-oﬀ value   u (Π0
Total (c0) > u) and the market is
highly competitive (u ∈ [u, Π0
Total (c0)]) the following allocation is a candidate for subgame
perfect equilibrium under EDT: The seller sets the price at the same level as under ED,
the buyer never chooses termination, total payoﬀ is socially optimal and the buyer earns
his reservation utility u.
12ii) u ≤ ¯ u. Inserting Pa = V into (22) it follows from u ≤   u that the buyer will earn a
non-negative rent. Using (13) the seller’s participation constraint is given by:
Π
a
S (V ,c0) = V − c0 − (1 − γ)δE  V ≥ 0. (25)
Rewriting this condition using   u = E  V − V gives us:
Π
0
Total (c0) ≥   u. (26)
We can therefore write the following lemma:
Lemma 3 If total payoﬀ exceeds cut-oﬀ value   u (Π0
Total (c0) > u) and the market is not
too competitive (u ∈ [0, u)), the following allocation is a candidate for subgame perfect
equilibrium under EDT: The seller sets price at V , the buyer never chooses termination,
total payoﬀ is socially optimal and the buyer earns a non-negative rent.
b) Case V< P ≤V: At stage 2 it is optimal for the buyer to accept any oﬀer that gives
him at least his reservation utility u:
Π
b
Total (cb) − Π
b
S (cb) = E  V − P + πT (P − V ) ≥ u. (27)
One can see fromequation (16) that the seller’s payoﬀΠb
S is increasing in P. Therefore,
in equilibrium, the seller will oﬀer a price Pb at stage 1 such that condition (27) is binding:
Pb =
E  V − u − πTV
1 − πT
(28)
provided that his participation constraint:
Π
b
S (cb) = Π
b
Total (cb) − u ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Π
b
Total (cb) ≥ u (29)
is satisﬁed. Rewriting this condition using equations (14) and (17) gives us:
Π
0
Total (c0) − φA − φP ≥ u. (30)
We can therefore write the following lemma:
Lemma 4 If the market is not too competitive (u ≤ Π0
Total (c0)−φA−φP ) the following
allocation is a candidate for equilibrium: The seller sets price at Pb and two kinds of
ineﬃciencies arise: 1) Ex post ineﬃciency φP because the good sometimes ends up with
the seller. 2)Ex ante ineﬃciency φA due to overinvestment into quality because the seller
anticipates opportunistic termination by the buyer. The buyer earns his reservation utility
u.
13Proof. See Appendix A for the proof of the overinvestment result. The intuition
of the proof is easy to understand: As the buyer gets his reservation utility, the entire
expected loss of welfare due to termination is absorbed by the seller. This provides
excessive investment incentives to the seller as, by increasing investment, he can lower
the probability of termination.
We can now characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in our leading case as illus-
trated in Figure 4:
Lemma 5 If Π0
Total > u and u−φ > 0, where φ ≡ φA−φP, the seller’s price oﬀer under





E  V − u for u ≥ u ≡ E  V − V
V for u ∈ [u − φ, u)
Pb =
E￿ V −u−πTV
[1−πT] for u ∈ [0,u − φ)
.
If the seller oﬀers V the buyer will earn a positive rent. Otherwise he gets his reservation
utility. Total payoﬀ achieves ﬁrst best unless the seller chooses Pb.
Proof. For Π0
Total > u and u >   u Lemma 2 describes the only feasible equilibrium
candidate. This is because Lemma 3 requires u ≤   u and Lemma 4 requires a parameter
constellation that implies u <   u. The latter claim can be seen by using the fact that
condition (27) holds with equality:
u = E  V − P + πt (P − V ) < E  V − P + (P − V ) =   u. (31)
Therefore Lemma 2 characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium for Π0
Total > u and
u >   u.
For Π0
Total > u and u ≤   u Lemma 3 describes a candidate for equilibrium. It will




S (V ,c0) ≥ Π
b
S (Pb) = Π
b
Total (cb) − u. (32)
Using equations (25) and (17) and rearranging gives us:
u ≥ E  V − V −
 
(cb − c0) + (γ0 − γb)δE  V
 
− [πT (1 − δ)V ]. (33)
Substituting   u = E  V −V and φ ≡ φA+φP (see expressions (20) and (18)) we can rewrite
the condition as follows:
u ≥   u − φ. (34)
Therefore the equilibrium characterized by Lemma 3 will be the subgame perfect equi-
librium of the EDT game if Π0
Total > u and u ∈ [u − φ, u). Moreover, it follows that for
u <   u − φ Lemma 4 characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the EDT game,
14provided that the seller’s participation constraint (30) is satisﬁed. Using φ <   u − u and
Π0
Total > u we can write:
Π
0
Total (c0) − φ > Π
0
Total (c0) −   u + u > u (35)
which means that the seller’s PC will always be satisﬁed. The remaining parts of the
lemma follow directly form Lemmas 2-4.
5.3 Comparing Prices
Comparing ED and EDT with respect to the seller’s price oﬀer, we can derive the following
lemma:
Lemma 6 i) If the seller sets the price at E  V − u under EDT, it will be the same as
under ED. ii) If the seller oﬀers price V under EDT it will be lower than under ED. iii)
If under EDT the seller oﬀers Pb it will be higher than under ED.25
Proof. Part i) follows immediately from (7). Whenever the seller oﬀers V under
EDT, u < u must hold by Lemma 5. Inserting u = E  V − V we get V < E  V − u which
vindicates part ii). Pb > E  V − u is equivalent to πT
 
E  V − u − V
 
> 0. Substituting
u = E  V − V we can write πT (u − u) > 0. This will always hold for u < u−φ, which by
Lemma 5 is true whenever the seller oﬀers Pb under EDT. This gives us part iii).
Our main result in Proposition 1 largely summarizes the lemmas of this section but
drops the assumption of Lemma 5 that Π0
Total > u and u−φ > 0. This creates considerable
complication without helping intuition. We will therefore relegate the proof to Appendix
B. The main problem is that we have to make a case distinction which does not yield to
an intuitive interpretation until we rewrite the conditions in terms of quality parameter
δ. We also make use of the structure imposed by the seller’s investment decision.
6 Eﬃciency
It is not surprising that curbing the monopoly power of the seller is also likely to lead
to eﬃciency gains. In order to illustrate this fact, we will present an example where this
is the case. Let us imagine two consumers i = 1,2 with identical valuation but diﬀerent
wealth constraints w1 > w2 > c0 who are potential consumers of a single unit of the
good.26 We assume that valuation is high enough such that trade is socially desirable.
25The third part of this lemma may seem counter-intuitive. If the seller oﬀers Pb the buyer earns
his reservation utility just as under ED. So, one could ask why the price can rise if at the same time
joint payoﬀ is lower due to ineﬃciency. The reason is that the option to terminate increases the buyer’s
expected payoﬀ by more than the amount of the ineﬃciency.
26Assuming identical valuation has the advantage that we do not have to change the above benchmark
for eﬃcient investment. Otherwise a seller who cannot distinguish types would adjust quality investments
to the valuation of the average customer. This is the reason why we construct the downward sloping
demand curve by assuming wealth constraints.
15The highest price that the seller can set under the ED regime is still given by P = E  V −u.
Now, let us assume that w1 > E  V − u > w2. Then, the seller knows that if he sets the
price below or at w2 he can win over an additional customer. From a welfare perspective
it is always desirable to trade with both customers. Yet, for the seller this will only be
attractive if the extra proﬁt he makes by gaining the additional customer, outweighs the
loss of proﬁt he incurs by also reducing the price for the customer who is able to pay
the high price. This resonates with standard monopoly theory which predicts that a
non-discriminating monopolist tends to produce a smaller output than socially optimal
because he takes into account the eﬀect of price reduction owing to an increase in output





w2 − c0 − (1 − γ0)δE  V
 
> E  V − c0 − (1 − γ0)δE  V − u
E  V − u otherwise
(36)
The condition for lowering the price in order to serve the low wealth customer under
the ED regime is therefore:
w2 >   wED ≡
[1 + (1 − γ0)δ]E  V + c0 − u
2
. (37)
Now, we turn to the EDT regime. For simplicity, we assume that Case A applies (see
Figure 7 in Appendix B). Then, if there is only one consumer, we have shown that the
seller will set the price at V which is the highest price for which no termination occurs.
Of course, trade with the low wealth consumer occurs if V < w2. However, this is not a
necessary condition for increased output under EDT. Indeed, if V > w2, the seller will





w2 − c0 − (1 − γ0)δE  V
 
> V − c0 − (1 − γ0)δE  V
V otherwise
(38)
The condition for lowering the price in order to serve the low wealth customer under
the EDT regime is therefore:
w2 >   wEDT ≡
V¨+ (1 − γ0)δE  V + c0
2
=
[1 + (1 − γ0)δ]E  V + c0 − (E  V − V )
2
(39)
We can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If w2 ∈ [  wEDT,   wED] the seller will not lower the price in order to serve
the low wealth customer under the ED regime but will do so under the EDT regime.
Therefore introducing the EDT regime increases eﬃciency by enabling a more eﬃcient
volume of trade.
Proof. Remember from Figure 7 that if Case A applies, the seller will set the price
at V for u ∈ [0,   u) and at the same level as under ED if u ∈ [  u, Π0
Total]. Thus it can
16be seen from expressions (39) and (37) that   wEDT <   wED as u <   u = E  V − V for all
u ∈ [0,   u).
The intuition is that, as the price under EDT is lower anyway, the margin that the
seller has to sacriﬁce in order to accommodate the low wealth customer is smaller than
under ED.27 He will therefore produce a higher output under EDT. Thus, we have shown
that EDT serves as a functional substitute to price regulation, which might, however, be
less prone to the latter’s informational problems (e.g. Sheshinski (1976)). This makes
EDT especially attractive for an intermediate range of market structures.
7 Comparative Statics
7.1 Devaluation due to non-conformity (δ)
Casual empiricism suggests that the distribution of δ may be double-peaked at relatively
modest and very high δ. Quite often, non-conformity will consist in little defects which
will reduce the value of the good by only a fraction: A software program may work well
most of the time but some features may be bugged. Or, the weave of clothes may be
ﬂawed at some barely visible spot. On the other hand, it seems to be frequent that non-
conforming goods have no use at all. There is very little value to a TV set that does not
work. Such binary quality is common for most electronic devices. If this description of
reality is approximately correct, it would vindicate our earlier claim that the theoretical
ineﬃciency associated with the EDT regime are empirically negligible. Indeed, we know
from Proposition (1) that for high devaluation due to non-conformity ineﬃcient invest-
ment and ex post trade decisions may arise in uncompetitive markets. In competitive
markets there will even be loss of trade volume. Yet, for δ −→ 1 this ineﬃciency tends
to zero as is implied by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The higher δ the lower the ineﬃciency in the event of trade. Moreover,
the no trade interval shrinks for ever higher u. In the limit case, were δ = 1, there will
be no loss of trade volume under EDT and the seller will always choose Pb. Therefore,
although price increases, there will be no redistribution eﬀect and joint surplus does not
deviate from ﬁrst-best.
Proof. Appendix C.
Another implication of the proposition is that product groups with high δII are likely
to beneﬁt from EDT. Not only will the redistribution eﬀect occur for a large interval of
27A negative eﬀect on trade volume can occur in this setting, if there is a positive probability of
termination under the EDT regime. This is because the contract price increases (e.g. for low u in Case
B). It is, however, straightforward to see that this problem is due to modelling the downward sloping
demand curve by assuming wealth constraints. As mentioned earlier, this assumption was adopted
for expositional reasons. The direction of the eﬀect is unambigously positive if the downward sloping
demand curve is due to diﬀerent valuations. Indeed, the consumer will receive the same value as under
ED because the higher price is compensated by the higher value due to the option to terminate.
17u
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Figure 5:
u in this case but also ineﬃciency, if it arises at all, will be low. Figure (5) illustrates
this fact. C1 depicts the situation for high δII, while C2 shows the eﬀect for low δII.
The shaded area shows the amount of ineﬃciency. Threshold value δII will be high if the
buyer’s valuation in the low state V is not too small and the probability 1 − λ that the
buyer changes his mind about the product is high (See Appendix C).
7.2 Consistency of valuation (λ)
When parties enter into a contract it is often not clear what the value of the good will
be at the time when the buyer may invoke lack of conformity. If, for example, somebody
buys furniture or household equipment which is tailored to his house the value of these
goods to him will be much lower if he has to move somewhere else. Yet, even less drastic
events can bring this about. The buyer might as well discover that he does not like the
good as much as he thought. Or, he discovers another good which he likes even more
(Shavell (1980) p. 470). In any such case the buyer will be delighted to be able to reverse
the transaction if delivery turns out to be non-conforming.
It is diﬃcult to imagine a situation where it is certain that the valuation of the buyer
will decrease (λ = 0). Maybe the best examples are cases of deception or mental black
out for which special provisions exist in the law which are not the focus of our analysis.
Also the opposite case (λ = 1), where we can be absolutely sure that the valuation stays
the same will be rare. Maybe this would be the case for life saving medicine. Generally,
cases will lie in between. The following proposition looks on how results vary for diﬀerent
levels of λ:
Proposition 4 (a) If valuation is unlikely to stay high (low λ) the relative importance
of the redistribution eﬀect increases in λ. In the limit case, where it is sure that valuation
will be low (λ = 0), EDT will produce the same result as under ED. (b) For intermediate















probabilities the relative importance of the eﬀect will decrease in λ. (c) For high probability
that valuation stays the same (high λ) we know from Proposition 1 that parties will trade
for low u, but ineﬃcient investment and ex post trade decisions may arise. For high u
there will be no trade despite ex ante gains of trade. Yet, as λ increases, this ineﬃciency
decreases and the no-trade interval shrinks to ever higher u. In the limit case λ = 1, the
eﬀect of EDT and ED is the same.
Proof. Appendix D.
Relevant factors determining the consistency of the valuation may be buyer charac-
teristics or the industry’s pace of product innovation. Moreover, the marketing literature
has identiﬁed products where "cognitive dissonance" is likely to be high. This may induce
buyers to regret their buying decision.28
The main legal instrument inﬂuencing consistency of valuation is the time limit for
invoking lack of conformity. With time, the probability that parameters relevant for the
valuation change is likely to increase. European warranty law is rather generous: It does
not require the consumer to invoke lack of conformity at the time of delivery, as very
often defects are hidden and will become apparent much later. And, even if the consumer
discovers it right away, the law in many European countries still allows him to invoke
non-conformity for at least two years after the good has been delivered.29 Especially this
latter provision has been criticized by lawyers on the ground that a buyer who does not
invoke his right immediately no longer deserves the protection of the law. If he continues
to have the right to terminate the law merely supports "speculation at the cost of the
28This is said to be the case for "high involvement products" (e.g. Kaish (1967) and Solomon (2004)
p. 233 and the literature cited there). Cognitive Dissonance is one of the reasons why luxury brands not
only direct advertisment to prospective but also to existing customers.
29Recital 19 of the Preamble of the EC Directive 1999/44 allows countries to introduce a two month
term of decadence within which the buyer must inform the seller of the lack of conformity. Many countries
did not make use of this provision.
19debtor" (Schlechtriem and Schmidt-Kessel (2005) AT Para 534).30 The only remaining
justiﬁcation would therefore be some consumer protection argument, e.g. that the legally
inexperienced consumer might otherwise not have enough time to pursue his right. We
oﬀer an alternative argument which justiﬁes rather generous time limits precisely because
they enable opportunistic termination. While it is correct that opportunistic termination
is bad if actually exercised it may serve as a threat (not carried out in equilibrium) that
helps to curb monopoly power. Yet, there are limits to the blessings of opportunistic
termination: As can be seen from Proposition 4, the positive eﬀect due to EDT will
subside if valuation is almost certain to be low at the time the consumer may invoke
lack of conformity (λ close to 0). Curiously, however, the least favorable outcome is to
be expected of a regime, which allows termination in principle, but tries to keep the
probability of opportunistic termination at fairly low levels (λ ∈ [λII,1]).
8 Conclusion
We have shown that the consumer does not pay the bill for the expansion of his rights
from ED to EDT. Quite the opposite, his share of the trade surplus may actually increase.
Moreover, by curbing the monopoly power of the seller, the redistribution eﬀect can also
improve welfare. Namely, it enables more eﬃcient trade volume in a setting with multiple
buyers. Thus private law can have an antitrust eﬀect in cases which are below the radar
screen of antitrust authorities. This provides an argument for mandatory termination
rights as stipulated in the EC directive 1999/44. Indeed, as the eﬀect is to curb monopoly
power of the seller, the EDT regime would never be the outcome of free negotiations in
uncompetitive markets. For the United States the policy implication would be to consider
making Article 2 of the UCC mandatory.
We have also shown that the scepticism of many legal scholars towards generous
termination rights is overblown. In particular, our model oﬀers no justiﬁcation for the
fact that the law tends to disallow termination unless non-conformity passes a certain
threshold level.31 Quite the opposite, the EDT regime seems to perform rather well for
small defects.32
Finally, our analysis also has an interesting implication for contracting even if EDT
is not mandatory. One could easily imagine that two companies making a deal have a
commercial team which bargains over the price, a technical team which works out the
exact speciﬁcation of the good to be traded and legal team which agrees on the legal
30Traditionally there are two techniques that the law uses to restrict the possibility of opportunistic
termination: One is to introduce a notiﬁcation requirement, the other is to require the buyer to inspect
the goods upon delivery. Failure to do either of these would entail forfeiture of termination rights (e.g.
the German Commercial Code §377 HBG).
31Article 3 (6) of the EC Directive 1999/44 disallows termination if the non-conformity is "minor". In
common law the prerequisite for termination is "material breach" (see Farnsworth (2004) § 8.15)
32This will, however, not be true if renegotiations are possible.
20remedies which govern the transaction. Our analysis suggests that given a package of
product characteristics and legal remedies parties cannot just freely bargain about the
price. We have shown, that inserting a termination clause into the contract will restrict
the set of prices that reasonable parties are able to agree upon. This eﬀect depends on the
probability of non-conformity which in turn is determined by the technical speciﬁcation
of the good. We therefore predict that contract renegotiations in uncompetitive markets
will be a integrated process which comprehensively deals with commercial, technical and
legal issues. Another - empirically testable - implication would be that retail companies
who either by ﬁrm policy or law are required to oﬀer the same termination rights for all
of their products will earn lower mark-ups on goods which are likely to become defective
(e.g. clothes) than on goods where this is not the case (e.g. cosmetics). This diﬀerence
should be more pronounced as termination rights become more generous. We leave testing
these empirical hypotheses to further research.
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9.1 Appendix A
in order to say more about the seller’s investment decision cb. Using (29) and (16) it







Total − u (40)
= argmax
c E  V − c − (1 − γ)δE  V − πT (1 − δ)V − u.
As the probability of conforming delivery is   γ if the seller invest   c, and 0 otherwise,
it follows that the seller will invest only if:
E  V − δE  V − (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V − u (41)
< E  V − c − (1 − γ)δE  V − (1 − λ)(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V − u.
Rearranging, the seller’s optimal investment decision can be written as:
cb =
 
  c if c
γ < δE  V + (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V
0 otherwise
. (42)
As (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V > 0, it can be seen by comparing expressions (42) and (3) that:










In Lemma 5 we did not pay attention to the parties’ participation constraints and assumed
Π0
Total ≥   u. In order to arrive at Proposition 1 we have to deal with these shortcomings.
For u ≥ u ≡ E  V − V , which is the case in which the seller would oﬀer E  V − u the
buyer’s participation constraint (PC) is satisﬁed by assumption (u ≥ 0). However, in
order for the seller’s PC to be satisﬁed, u must not exceed total payoﬀ:





We can therefore derive the following lemma:
Lemma 7 Under the EDT regime, the seller will set price at E  V −u, which is the same
price as under the the ED regime, if and only if
Π
0






with u = E  V − V > 0 and Π0
Total = E  V − c0 − (1 − γ0)δE  V .
22For u < u the seller prefers to oﬀer V if u ≥ u−φ and Pb for u < u−φ. The buyer’s
PC is satisﬁed by deﬁnition if the seller chooses Pb (as u ≥ 0). If the seller lowers the
price to V this is true all the more. In this case the buyer’s PC is not even binding, which
means that the buyer receives a rent.
The seller’s PC, however, is more problematic: If u ≥ u − φ and consequently V is
preferred to Pb the following must hold:
Π
a
S (V ) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ V − c0 − (1 − γ0)δE  V ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Π
0
Total ≥ u. (45)
Taking into account that u − φ may be negative we can write the following lemma:
Lemma 8 Under the EDT regime, the seller oﬀers V , if and only if
Π
0
Total ≥ u ∧ u − φ > 0 ∧ u ∈ [u − φ, u)
Π
0
Total ≥ u ∧ u − φ ≤ 0 ∧ u ∈ [0, u)
The seller voluntarily gives up bargaining power. This price leaves a rent to the buyer.
If u < u−φ and, consequently, Pb is more attractive than V the following must hold:
ΠS2 (Pb) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Π
b
Total − u = Π
0
Total − φ − u ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ u ≤ Π
0
Total − φ. (46)
Therefore the seller will choose P = Pb if and only if u < u − φ ∧ u ≤ Π0
Total − φ. As
u > 0 this is only possible if min[u − φ, Π0
Total − φ] ≥ 0. Note that if u < Π0
Total, u <
u − φ implies u < Π0
Total − φ, so that the PC of the seller is automatically satisﬁed. We
can write the following lemma:
Lemma 9 The seller will choose P2 if and only if
u < Π
0












Lemma 8 implies that it cannot happen that the seller voluntarily gives up bargaining
power for Π0
Total < u. To see this, consider that if V is preferred to Pb the seller’s
participation constraint will always be violated as stated in expression (45). But also
Pa = E  V − u will never be oﬀered as follows from Lemma 7. Thus, if Π0
Total < u,
the seller either oﬀers Pb or his PC is violated. On the other hand, for Π0
Total ≥ u the
participation constraint of the seller will hold for all cases of potential gains of trade,
u ∈ [0,Π0
Total]. We can therefore write the following corollary:
Corollary 1 There will be no trade despite of potential gains of trade if and only if
Π
0
Total ≤ u ∧ Π
0










Total ≤ u ∧ Π
0








Total ≥ u trade volume will always be eﬃcient under the EDT regime.
239.2.2 Cases
If Π0
Total < 0 there is no trade under EDT but neither under ED. This is not a problem
as there are no potential gains of trade. If Π0
Total > 0, it follows from lemma 7 - 9 that
it is possible to distinguish four cases:
Case A: Π0
Total > u ∧ u − φ ≤ 0 :
P =
 
V for u ∈ [0, u)











1−πT for u ∈ [0, u − φ)
V for u ∈ [u − φ, u)
Pa = E  V − u for u ∈ [u, Π0
Total]
. (48)
Figure 7 shows cases A and B which share the property that Π0
Total > u. The shaded
area shows the ineﬃciency that may arise.
0

















u u φ −
0

















u u φ −
Figure 7: Cases for low devaluation due to non-conforming delivery.
Case C: Π0





1−πT for u ∈ [0, Π0
Total − φ)
no trade for u ∈ [Π0




Total ≤ u ∧ Π0
Total − φ ≤ 0. In the extreme case, where Π0
Total − φ ≤ 0 there
is no trade at all.
Figure 8 shows cases C and D which share the common feature that Π0
Total ≤ u. Not
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9.2.3 Rewriting in terms of δ
So far our results would allow us to predict the impact of a shift from EDT to ED. By
calculating Π0
Total,   u and φ we can predict the eﬀect on investment, prices, allocative
eﬃciency and trade volume for any given u. When it comes to general qualitative state-
ments, however, a distinction of cases depending on the threshold values Π0
Total,   u,   u−φ
and Π0
Total −φ is not very helpful unless one can give intuitive meaning to them. We will
do so indirectly by writing the conditions for cases A, B, C and D in terms of δ which
measures the devaluation due to non-conformity. Substituting Π0
Total,   u and φ in the
above conditions and rearranging, we can derive the following lemma:
25Lemma 10 In terms of δ the above conditions can be written as:
Case A : Π
0
Total > u ∧ u − φ ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ δ < δII ∧ δ ≤ δI,
Case B : Π
0
Total > u ∧ u − φ > 0 ⇐⇒ δ < δII ∧ δ > δI,
Case C : Π
0
Total ≤ u ∧ Π
0
Total − φ > 0 ⇐⇒ δ ≥ δII ∧ δ < δIII,
Case D : Π
0
Total ≤ u ∧ Π
0







[(1 − λ)(1 − γb) − λ(  − 1)]V + (cb − c0)





















[λ  + γb (1 − λ)]V − cb





We can signiﬁcantly simplify Lemma 10 by making use of the structure imposed by
the investment decision of the seller. We can distinguish three cases depending on the
eﬃciency of the quality assurance technology. If technology is very ineﬃcient, the seller
will neither invest under the ED nor under the EDT regime (i). For intermediate eﬃciency
levels he will invest under the EDT but not under the ED regime (ii). If the technology
is very eﬃcient he will invest under both regimes (iii).
i) Low Eﬃciency: If
c
γ
> δE  V + (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V (50)
the quality assurance technology is very ineﬃcient and the seller will not invest in
quality even if he knows that termination is part of the buyer’s equilibrium strategy:
c0 = cb = 0 =⇒ γ0 = γb = 0. (51)
Using (51) the following expressions simplify:
φA = 0 (52)
φP = (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V > 0
Π
0
Total = (1 − δ)E  V .
We can proof the following lemma:






E￿ V < δ
i
III = 1.
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II. From   > 1 =⇒ δ
i





ii) Intermediate Eﬃciency: If
δE  V <
c
γ
≤ δE  V + (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V (54)
the eﬃciency level of the quality assurance technology is intermediate. The seller will
only invest if termination will be part of the buyer’s equilibrium strategy:
c0 = 0 =⇒ γ0 = 0 ∧ cb = c =⇒ γb = γ. (55)
Using (55) the following expressions can be simpliﬁed:
φA = c − γδE  V , (56)
φP = (1 − λ)(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V > 0,
Π
0
Total = (1 − δ)E  V ,





We can prove the following lemma:







E￿ V < δ
ii
III = 1.
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[(1 − λ)(1 − γ) − λ(  − 1)]V + c










The ﬁrst claim can be immediately seen by plugging c0 = 0 and γ0 = 0 into the
expressions in Lemma 10. Using (54) we can write:
[(1 − λ)(1 − γ) − λ(  − 1)]V + c
[(1 − λ)(1 − γ) + γ (1 + λ  − λ)]V
(58)
<
[(1 − λ)(1 − γ) − λ(  − 1)]V + γδE  V + γ (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V
[(1 − λ)(1 − γ) + γ (1 + λ  − λ)]V
=
1 − λ (1 − γδ)
1 + λ(γ  − 1)
= 1 −
λ(  − 1) + λ γ (1 − δ)
1 − λ + λγ 
< 1 −
λ(  − 1)










[λ  + γb (1 − λ)]V − cb





27Then, using (54), we can write:
[λ  + γ (1 − λ)]V − c
(1 − γ)λ V
(60)
>
[λ  + γ (1 − λ)]V − γδE  V + γ (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V
(1 − γ)λ V
=
λ V − γδ
 
E  V − (1 − λ)V
 
(1 − γ)λ V
=
λ V − γδλ V




> 1 as γ,δ ∈ [0, 1].
This gives us the third claim.
iii) High Eﬃciency: If
c
γ
≤ δE  V (61)
the quality assurance technology is very eﬃcient. This means that the buyer will
always invest:
c0 = cb = c =⇒ γ0 = γb = γ. (62)
Using (62) the following expressions can be simpliﬁed:
φA = 0, (63)
φP = (1 − λ)(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V > 0,
Π
0
Total = E  V − c − (1 − γ)δE  V .
We can proof the following lemma:


















[(1 − λ)(1 − γ) − λ(  − 1)]























Plugging c0 = cb = c =⇒ γ0 = γb = γ into:
[(1 − λ)(1 − γb) − λ(  − 1)]V + (cb − c0)






[(1 − λ)(1 − γ) − λ(  − 1)]
(1 − λ)(1 − γ)
(66)
= 1 −
λ(  − 1)
(1 − λ)(1 − γ)
< 1 −































. Using (61) and δ ≤
V
E￿ V , which
must hold for all δ of the interval we can write:
c
γ
< δE  V <
V
E  V
E  V = V . (68)
This contradicts (67) and gives us the second claim. The third claim follows from
(59) and (60) from the proof of Lemma 12. Note, that c
γ ≤ δE  V + (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V is
implied by (61).
Summing up, we can derive the following lemma which together with the case dis-
tinction from subsection (9.2.2) gives us Proposition 1:






III, it is possible to considerably simplify lemma 10. Case
D will never arise. Case A, B and C will occur depending on the value of parameter δ:
Case A: δ ∈ [0, δI)
Case B: δ ∈ [δI, δII]







II , δ <
V
E￿ V is a suﬃcient condition for δ < δII.
9.3 Appendix C: Devaluation due to non-conformity (δ)






[1−( 1−λ)( 1−γ2)] for u ∈ [0, uI − φ]





φP = −(1 − λ)(1 − γ2)V < 0 (70)
ex post ineﬃciency shrinks for rising δ (It follows immediately from expression (18)
that in the limit case δ = 1 it will be 0). ex ante ineﬃciency only arises in cases
where investment levels diﬀer depending on whether termination is part of the buyer’s
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Figure 9:
equilibrium strategy or not. This is the case for intermediate eﬃciency of the quality
assurance technology:
δE  V <
c
γ
≤ δE  V + (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V . (71)
As δ rises the set of c
γ for which this condition is fulﬁlled shrinks. (In the limit case






(cb − c0) + (γ0 − γb)δE  V = (γ0 − γb)E  V ≤ 0. (72)
Therefore ineﬃciency φ = φP +φA will decrease in δ (will be 0 in the limit case δ = 1)
which implies that the no trade area u ∈ (uI − φ, uI] shrinks for rising δ (will be empty
in the limit case δ = 1).
Threshold δII:
Depending on the eﬃciency of the quality assurance technology, where index x =
i, ii, iii stands for low, intermediate and high eﬃciency, it follows from Lemma 10 that
threshold value δ
x















(1 − γ)E  V
. (73)
It will be high if the buyer’s valuation in the low state V is not too small and the
probability 1 − λ that the buyer changes his mind about the product is high.
309.4 Appendix D: Consistency of Valuation (λ)
9.4.1 Conditions in terms of λ
Lemma 15 We can write the conditions for case A, B, C in terms of λ:33
Case A : uI >   u ∧   u − φ ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ λ < λII ∧ λ ≤ λI, (74)
Case B : uI >   u ∧   u − φ > 0 ⇐⇒ λ < λII ∧ λ > λI,




(cb − c0) + (1 − γb)(1 − δ)V









[1 − δ (1 − γ0)]V − c0
















Depending on the eﬃciency of the quality assurance technology where superscripts i-iii











c + (1 − γ)(1 − δ)V











[1 − δ (1 − γ)]V − c
δ (  − 1)(1 − γ)V
Proof. Inserting into uI >   u, one can write:
E  V − c0 − (1 − γ0)δE  V > λ(  − 1)V . (75)
Rearranging gives us:
λ < λII ≡
[1 − δ(1 − γ0)]V − c0
δ (  − 1)(1 − γ0)V
. (76)
Inserting into   u ≤ φ, one can write:
(  − 1)V −(cb − c0)−(γ0 − γb)δ [1 + λ(  − 1)]V −(1 − λ)(1 − γb)(1 − δ)V ≤ 0. (77)
Rearranging gives us:
λ ≤ λI ≡
(cb − c0) + (1 − γb)(1 − δ)V
[(  − 1) − δ(γ0 − γb)(  − 1) + (1 − γb)(1 − δ)]V
> 0. (78)
Proof. Inserting into uI > φ, one can write:
E  V −c0−(1 − γ0)δE  V −(cb − c0)−(γ0 − γb)δE  V −(1 − λ)(1 − γb)(1 − δ)V > 0 (79)
33Case D does not have to be considered as was already proven in terms of δ in Lemma (14):
31Rearranging gives us:
(1 − δ + γbδ)[1 + λ(  − 1)]V − cb − (1 − λ)(1 − γb)(1 − δ)V > 0 (80)
Solving for λ, we can write:
λ > λIII ≡
cb − γbV
V [(1 − δ + γbδ)  − γb]
. (81)








(1−δ)[1+λ( −1)] > 0
Proof. The sign depends on the sign of the numerator of the ﬁrst order derivative:
N = (  − 1)(1 − δ)[1 + λ(  − 1)] − λ(  − 1)
2 (1 − δ) (82)













Proof. This is true because ¯ u
uii










[1−δ(1−γ)]E￿ V −c > 0.
Proof. The numerator of the ﬁrst order derivative is:
N = (  − 1)V [[1 − δ(1 − γ)]V − c]. (83)
As (  − 1)V is positive the sign of the numerator depends on the sign of [1 − δ(1 − γ)]V −
c. As c < γδE  V , we can write:
[1 − δ(1 − γ)]V − c (84)
> [1 − δ(1 − γ)]V − γδE  V
= [1 − δ(1 − γ) − γδ − γδλ(  − 1)]V
= [1 − δ[1 + γλ(  − 1)]]V .
As V is positive the sign depends on the sign of 1 − δ[1 + γλ(  − 1)]. As it must be








E￿ V = 1
1+λ( −1) by Lemma (13), we can write:
1 − δ[1 + γλ(  − 1)] >
 
1 −
1 + γλ(  − 1)
1 + λ(  − 1)
 
> 0 (85)
which proves the claim.








(1−δ)[1+λ( −1)]V < 0.
Proof. The numerator of the ﬁrst order derivative can be written as:
N = −(1 − δ)
2 V
2 [1 + λ(  − 1)] − (1 − δ)
2 (  − 1)(1 − λ)V
2 (86)









Proof. The numerator of the ﬁrst order derivative can be written as:
−(1 − δ)[1 + λ(  − 1)][γδ (  − 1) + (1 − γ)(1 − δ)]V
2 (87)
−[c − γδ[1 + λ(  − 1)]V + (1 − λ)(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V ](1 − δ)(  − 1)V
= −(1 − δ)[1 + λ(  − 1)][(1 − γ)(1 − δ)]V
2
−[c + (1 − λ)(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V ](1 − δ)(  − 1)V .


















I = [1 − δ (1 − γ)](  − 1)V
the numerator of the ﬁrst order derivative can be written as:
N = −(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V {[1 − δ (1 − γ)][1 + λ(  − 1)]V − c} (89)
−(1 − λ)(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V   [1 − δ (1 − γ)](  − 1)V
= −(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V {[1 − δ (1 − γ)]V − c}
−(1 − γ)(1 − δ)[1 − δ (1 − γ)](  − 1)V
2
= −(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V {[1 − δ (1 − γ)] V − c}.
As −(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V is negative the sign of the numerator depends on the sign of
[1 − δ(1 − γ)] V − c. Using:
u
III
I > 0 ⇐⇒ [1 − δ (1 − γ)][1 + λ(  − 1)]V > c (90)
it can be written:
[1 − δ(1 − γ)] V − c > [1 − δ(1 − γ)] V − [1 − δ (1 − γ)][1 + λ(  − 1)]V (91)
= [1 − δ(1 − γ)][(1 − λ)(  − 1)]V > 0.
Therefore the sign of the numerator will be negative.
339.4.4 Comparative statics for interval: λ ∈ [λII, 1]
Lemma 22 ∂
∂λφ
i < 0, ∂
∂λφ
































[c − γδ[1 + λ(  − 1)V ] + (1 − λ)(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V ]










[(1 − λ)(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V ] = −(1 − γ)(1 − δ)V < 0
the claim follows from equation 49.
9.4.5 Continuity
Lemma 23 The function φ(λ) is continuous at c
γ = δE  V + (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V and at
c




ii = γ (1 − λ)(1 − δ)V + γδE  V − c. (93)





iii = c − γδE  V . (94)
Inserting c = γδE  V , we see that φ
ii − φ
iii = 0.
9.4.6 Extreme cases: λ = 0, λ = 1
Lemma 24 If λ = 0, λ = 1, the outcome under EDT is identical to the outcome under
ED.




= 0. If uI > 0 i.e. if there are potential gains of trade,
this means that a degenerate case A applies, where the outcome under EDT is identical
to the outcome under ED. If λ = 1, case C will apply. ex post ineﬃciency, however, will
be 0. As δE  V +(1 − λ)(1 − δ)V = δE  V = δ V , there will never be ex ante ineﬃciency.
Therefore results under EDT will be the identical as under the ED regime.
Summarizing Lemmas (15)-(24) gives us Proposition (4).
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